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Endangered Species Information:
Access and Control
Robert L. Fischman* & Vicky J. Meretsky**
I. INTRODUCTION
In his keynote contribution to this special issue of the Washburn
Law Journal, Professor Sax spotlights restoration and the ways the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)1 promotes new forms of collabora-
tive governance to manage ecosystems.  All of the changes that he
documents, from multi-agency watershed councils to habitat conserva-
tion planning, will require better and more prompt information to suc-
ceed.  Indeed, one of the greatest challenges to the effectiveness of
administrative innovation is our poor understanding of the precise re-
lationships between human activities, such as forest practices or resi-
dential development, and species recovery.
Adaptive management itself, which almost everyone agrees is a
key element in Sax’s “new age of environmental restoration,” is infor-
mation intensive.2  Adaptive management responds to dynamic eco-
logical characteristics by “[r]ecognizing that every land management
practice is an experiment with an uncertain outcome.”3  In adaptive
management, authorized activities are coordinated and monitored to
determine their effects on species or other resources of concern.4  The
information gained then feeds back “to adjust management in a desir-
able direction.”5
One of the fundamental needs of the new age of environmental
restoration, therefore, will be more effective use of existing informa-
* Professor, Indiana University School of Law–Bloomington; Senior Research Scholar,
Yale Law School (2001).  I am grateful to Myrl Duncan for the invitation to contribute to this
symposium.  I wish to thank Beth Cate, Fred Cate, Patrick Parenteau, and Craig Pease for gener-
ously sharing their insightful thoughts and work on this topic.  An Indiana University School of
Law summer research grant and the Yale Law School supported this work.
** Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1999).
2. Joseph L. Sax, The New Age of Environmental Restoration, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2001).
Professor Sax uses the term adaptive management in describing the ESA “no surprises policy.”
Id. at 5.
3. Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, As They Apply to Environmen-
tal Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 907.  Adaptive management is based on feedback from
continual management experimentation.
4. See generally KAI N. LEE, COMPASS & GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLIT-
ICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1993); C.J. WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE
RESOURCES (1986).  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service provides a helpful bibliography of rele-
vant adaptive management literature in Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the
Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed.
Reg. 35242, 35256-57 (2000).
5. Id. See also Tim W. Clark et al., Synthesis, in ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY: FIND-
ING THE LESSONS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS 417, 425 (Tim W. Clark et al. eds., 1994).
90
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tion and more research to create new information.6  More effective
use of existing information will often require widespread, early, and
rapid disclosure of research results.  More research will require
greater funding.  The lack of good data on endangered species and
poor access to existing data is symptomatic of a larger failure to em-
ploy adaptive management.7  This is especially true for endangered
species,8 where failure to use current and accurate information can
compromise species’ chances for recovery.9  For instance, lack of mon-
itoring and assessment information about grizzly bears throughout the
1980s and the 1990s impeded recovery.10  Poor experimental design
and poor access to data flow, in large part, from the neglect of the
empirical research component of management decisions.  This article
focuses on access and control of information as an indicator of the gap
between adaptive management theory and actual agency practice.
Outside of medicine, publication of scientific research generally
proceeds at a pace not dictated by a strong sense of urgency.  The
traditional understanding of scientists is that data are not released un-
til the researcher is ready to publish.  Scientists may guard their data
6. See Erica Fleishman, Moving Scientific Review Beyond Academia, 15 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 547 (2001) (“We will not achieve our conservation mission unless research is executed,
results disseminated, and management actions initiated at a rapid pace.”); Tim W. Clark et al.,
supra note 7, at 420.
7. Richard P. Reading & Brian J. Miller, The Black-footed Ferret Recovery Program: Un-
masking Professional and Organizational Weaknesses, in ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY:
FINDING THE LESSONS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS 73, 88-90 (Tim W. Clark et al. eds., 1994); U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREST SERVICE DECISION-MAKING: A FRAMEWORK FOR IM-
PROVING PERFORMANCE 41-45 (1997) (GAO/RCED-97-71).
8. The ESA protects two different categories of species, threatened and endangered, that
suffer serious risk of extinction.  16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20) (1999).  However, for the purposes of
this article, we will use the term “endangered species” broadly to include any species receiving
the special protection of the ESA.  Another, more technical term, “listed species,” also refers to
both categories of species.  Though some threatened animals enjoy less protection than endan-
gered animals under the ESA, generally the issues we discuss in this article apply equally to
both.  Threatened and endangered plants, on the other hand, are largely unprotected from non-
federal activities and not subject to the ESA permits discussed in this article.
9. Currently, 1244 species in the United States are listed under the ESA. U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES SYSTEM (TESS),  http://ecos.fws.
gov/tess/html/boxscore.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2001).  A species does not receive protection
under the ESA until either the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries
Service lists it through notice and comment rulemaking.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(a).  Unfortunately, by
the time species receive protection under the ESA, their populations are generally so small that
recovery is an extraordinarily difficult task and many habitat management alternatives are fore-
closed.  David S. Wilcove et al., What Exactly Is an Endangered Species?  An Analysis of the U.S.
Endangered Species List: 1985-1991, 7 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 87, 92 (1993).  Once a popula-
tion level falls below a certain threshold, an “extinction vortex” pulls the species inexorably
toward extinction. Leah R. Gerber et al., Measuring Success in Conservation, 88 AM. SCIENTIST
316, 323 (2000).
10. David J. Mattson & John J. Craighead, The Yellowstone Grizzly Bear Recovery Pro-
gram, in ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY: FINDING THE LESSONS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS
101, 112-25 (Tim W. Clark et al. eds., 1994).  Agency actions that harmed grizzly populations
often went unchallenged because there was no mechanism to force the agency to disclose sup-
porting data (which did not exist). Id.
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to avoid being preempted (or, “scooped”11), by other scientists pub-
lishing an interpretation of the data first.  This corresponds to a tradi-
tion that regards analysis or treatment of a data set as justifying only
one publication.  Adaptive management for species recovery will re-
quire a shift in the professional culture of conservation biologists to
view the access and disclosure customs in their field more from the
perspective of medicine and less from the perspective of the life sci-
ences in which many of them were trained.
In addition to the rapid responses often needed to recover endan-
gered species, most research in conservation biology is also distin-
guished by a dependence on government resources.  The funding for
research; the scientific permits allowing researchers to collect, harass,
or harm animals; the permission for access to public lands; and the
regulation controlling activities to ensure continued existence of im-
periled species all point to the pervasive public interest in the resulting
information.  This public claim for access countervails the customary
control researchers exert over data they collect.
In his recent book, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt,12 Professor
Sax examined the problem of access and control in the context of cul-
tural treasures, not biological ones.  We use the occasion of this special
issue to extend a bridge between Professor Sax’s book and his “new
age of environmental restoration.”  Section II of this article discusses
the peculiar challenges of information access and control for endan-
gered species recovery.  It highlights the need for avenues of disclo-
sure of data outside of the scientific peer-review process.  Section III
describes the legal framework for facilitating this disclosure.  Though
the Freedom of Information Act, the “Shelby Amendment” as inter-
preted by the Office of Management and Budget, and general princi-
ples of administrative law compel some public access to information
about endangered species, it is the ESA itself that best supports re-
forms to ensure prompt information disclosure. Section IV concludes
this article with recommendations, principally for reforms to the ESA
scientific permitting program, that will promote timely and easy access
to endangered species data without sacrificing the rewards for con-
ducting original research.
Results of complex analyses and long-term, cumulative studies le-
gitimately require time to complete, and are perhaps best handled
through peer-review publication.  But short-term research results,
year-to-year monitoring data, and assessments of methods, despite be-
ing easier to prepare, are often far less accessible.  The ESA conserva-
11. JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT 168 (1999) (quoting Stephen A.
Kaufman, THE COMPREHENSIVE ARAMAIC LEXICON (Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio)
Feb. 1992, at 5).
12. JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT (1999).
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tion and permitting provisions should require prompt availability of
this information, which is often overlooked in formal scholarly publi-
cation.  Rapid release of data would permit better monitoring of en-
dangered species recovery; better dissemination and evaluation of
conservation techniques; better communication between cooperating
entities; and better-informed participation by outside researchers,
oversight groups, and other stakeholders.
In some circumstances, disclosure of data would provide informa-
tion that would enable people to determine the precise location of
individuals in a population of an endangered species. To protect those
individuals from harm, statutory reform should allow narrowly drafted
exceptions to the general rule of open access.  Unfortunately, broad
exceptions tempt agencies and other decision-makers to shield their
programs from criticism.  As grizzly bear management illustrates, any
risk that location data might be used for poaching must be balanced
against the risk to the species from the lack of any adaptive correction
of poor management through outside review.13
II. CONSERVATION BIOLOGY AND THE PROBLEMS OF
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
In all fields of experimental science there exists a tension be-
tween the desire to control data in order to reap the customary reward
of first publication, and the desire to disseminate data that will con-
tribute to the timely advancement of knowledge and the refinement of
theory. Traditional notions of ownership emerging from human labor,
and sustaining incentives for commitment to an arduous experimental
project, bolster the researcher’s proprietary interest in controlling
analysis of experimental data.14  Pervasive federal funding of scientific
research supports disclosure as part of the public’s return on an
investment.
In general, professional consensus, not formal rules enforceable
through the legal system, balances these competing interests.  As Pro-
fessor Sax has shown, some fields, such as archeology and papyrology
(the study of ancient documents written on papyrus), employ strict
customs of proprietary rights for researchers who discover or secure
possession of sites or scrolls.15  In these fields, colleagues may wait for
decades before researchers release data or documents.
In the natural sciences, disclosure of raw or intermediate data is
also a problem.16  The peer-review process of scholarly publication
13. Mattson & Craighead, supra note 10, at 112-25.
14. SAX, supra note 12, at 174-75; JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27
(1698).
15. SAX, supra note 12, at 165-78.
16. Id. at 174.
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generally mediates conflicts that arise in science.17 But, conservation
biology presents two special complications that disrupt the customary
balance in science between a researcher’s expectation of first publica-
tion and obligation to share information.  First, and most importantly,
conservation biology, like medicine, is a mission-oriented science.18
Therefore, it is not simply the advancement of the abstract ideal of
scientific understanding that researchers serve.  It is also the protec-
tion and restoration of biological diversity.  In experiments or studies
involving species on the brink of extinction (and, adaptive manage-
ment makes most conservation projects experiments), researchers
may need to disclose preliminary or intermediate information to meet
the urgent needs of recovery.  Researchers may further need to abort
an experiment when it jeopardizes the well-being of a species.  In this
respect, also, conservation biology is like medicine, which requires a
researcher to end the experiment (or inform the distinctly affected
subject) if, during the course of research, doctors discover some unex-
pected adverse effect (or some distinct problem, e.g., a malignant tu-
mor, in a particular subject).19
Second, conservation biology’s central (though not entire) aim,
the prevention of extinction, coincides with a controversial law and
pervasive public control.  The ESA imposes special obligations on fed-
eral agencies and general restrictions on all persons pertaining to spe-
cies listed by the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) or the National
Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) (together, “the Services”).
Therefore, federal regulation entangles many conservation biology ex-
periments or studies, which often also involve field work on public
lands.  Moreover, federal agencies have duties to recovery listed spe-
cies that may be fulfilled only through better understanding of conser-
vation biology.  Researchers need the Services’ (and land
management agencies’) permission to conduct many experiments or
observations; and, the Services (and land management agencies) need
researchers to provide guidance on meeting legal requirements.  Both
needs in this relationship between scientists and agencies create addi-
tional tensions over the control and disclosure of information.
The traditional reliance on peer-reviewed publication, the gold
standard of academic standing and the advancement of knowledge, is
inadequate to meet the pressing challenges of ecological restoration.
This is not to say that peer review has no value in conservation biol-
17. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING RESEARCH THROUGH PEER RE-
VIEW (1987); Steven J. Rothman, A Review of Peer Review, 48 PHYSICS TODAY 124 (Sept. 1995).
18. Michael Soule´, What is Conservation Biology?, 35 BIOSCIENCE 727 (1985).
19. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman, Volunteer in Asthma Study Dies After Inhaling Drug,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at A16; Gina Kolata, Parkinson’s Research Is Set Back By Failure of
Fetal Cell Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001, at A1.
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ogy.  To the contrary, it is a crucial process for establishing uniformity,
credibility, and continuity in the development of theory and knowl-
edge, as it is in other sciences.20  Though full disclosure of data is
rarely included in academic journals, often some of the data are
presented.  And, scientists increasingly turn to the internet “web” to
supplement publications with databases.  Still, peer review alone has
failed to provide the information necessary to succeed in environmen-
tal restoration.
One reason why traditional scholarly publication does not pro-
vide adequate access to data is that much information about endan-
gered species comes from management activities that lack any explicit
research component.  Adaptive management’s insistence on regular
assessment and readjustment is widely accepted in theory but seldom
applied in practice.21  Without research objectives, management pro-
grams generally lack publication goals and may not even produce un-
published (or, “in-house”) reports.22  Where an agency or contractor
does produce reports, they may be quietly shelved, particularly if they
do not support agency policy.  The variable speed of production and
level of detail of these sources of information leave researchers and
managers with an inconsistent and incomplete grasp of the health of a
species.  Also, a management program without research objectives
will likely yield information that falls short of good scientific experi-
mental design standards.
However, even where explicit research leads to a traditional peer-
reviewed publication, the information disclosed may still be inade-
quate to meet the needs of adaptive management for environmental
restoration.  First, peer review is a slow process.  The current issue of
Conservation Biology, the flagship peer-reviewed publication for the
scientific discipline that concerns itself most directly with ecological
restoration, contains articles that have waited up to twenty-six months
between submission and publication.23  The editor of the journal de-
tects a “simmering crisis” over the disparity between the conservation
need for prompt publication and the time required for peer review.24
20. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17.
21. C.S. Holling & Gary K. Meffe, Command and Control and the Pathology of Natural
Resource Management, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 328 (1996).  For examples, see supra note 7.
22. These reports are sometimes categorized as “gray literature.”  Laura H. Watchman et
al., Science and Uncertainty in Habitat Conservation Planning, 89 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 351, 353
(2001).
23. See, e.g., Richard T. Kazmaier et al., Effects of Grazing on the Demography and Growth
of the Texas Tortoise, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1091 (2001) (twenty-six months); M.A. Mc-
Carthy et al., Testing the Accuracy of Population Viability Analysis, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
1030 (2001) (twenty-five months); David W. Crumpacker et al., Implications of Climatic Warm-
ing for Conservation of Native Trees and Shrubs in Florida, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1008
(2001) (twenty-three months).
24. Gary K. Meffe, Crisis in a Crisis Discipline, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 303 (2001).
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In addition, scientists may delay preparation of submissions for years
while they gather data over time or attend to other duties.
Second, even when published, the information contained in peer-
reviewed articles may not be complete enough to offer guidance for
management.  Publications rarely include discussion of problems and
failures, leaving managers and subsequent researchers inefficiently
solving the same problems and stumbling over the same errors.25  For
instance, the designs in neither the black-footed ferret nor the Califor-
nia condor recovery programs enabled information to be collected
that could assess the relative risks of different animal release tech-
niques, despite the strong likelihood that techniques differ in
effectiveness.26
Information may not be available because no one has the time to
write it up, because it is in a report that does not circulate, or because
it is held up in the peer-review process.  Alternatively, information
may be withheld intentionally because of a reluctance (particularly
among those who seldom write for a scientific audience) to submit to
the sometimes-withering criticism of the peer-review process or to
shield a program from close examination in order to secure continued
funding.27
For instance, the California condor recovery program began re-
leasing Andean condors to the wild in 1989, and California condors in
1992.  The FWS conducted the first release efforts, in southern Cali-
fornia, and continues to oversee releases in that area.  The Ventana
Wilderness Society and the Peregrine Fund conducted subsequent re-
lease efforts in central California and in northern Arizona, respec-
tively.  These two nonprofit organizations published informal notes
from the field at weekly or monthly intervals at public web sites, and
the FWS produced an irregularly published newsletter which began as
a quarterly but slowed as longer intervals separated each issue.  The
FWS has not published a newsletter on the condor release program
since December, 2000.  In twelve years, no participant published, and
the FWS did not perform, an analysis of the results of the release pro-
gram.  Not until a group of scientists (including a coauthor of this arti-
cle) working from outside the recovery program acquired and
analyzed the data did it become clear that lack of oversight had per-
mitted poor study design to persist for years, and that mortality rates
strongly indicated a need to address threats such as lead poisoning.  A
25. Id.; D.G. Kleiman et al., Improving the Evaluation of Conservation Programs, 14 CON-
SERVATION BIOLOGY 356 (2000).
26. Vicky J. Meretsky et al., Demography of the California Condor: Implications for Rees-
tablishment, 14 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 957 (2000); Richard P. Reading & Brian J. Miller,
supra note 7, at 89-90.
27. K.H. Redford & A. Tabor, Writing the Wrongs: Developing a Safe-Fail Culture in Con-
servation, 14 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1567 (2000).
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properly designed adaptive management program would have re-
quired far more timely analysis of available data and the opportunity
for independent review of study design and results.  Third-party re-
view does not guarantee action–the FWS still has not acted to reduce
lead availability to condors in release areas–however, outside pressure
is far stronger now that the issue and its implications have been raised
in a public forum.
III. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON ACCESS AND CONTROL OF
ENDANGERED SPECIES INFORMATION
A number of legal mechanisms are available for securing access
to information about endangered species.  However, each has its limi-
tations.  The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) is simultaneously
too broad and not broad enough.  On one hand, it fails (outside of
national parks) to protect precise location data that aid poachers and
others seeking to harm endangered species.  Even well-intentioned
trackers, such as wildlife photographers, may incidentally harass en-
dangered animals.  In this respect, FOIA provides too much access.
Indeed, in extreme cases, FOIA discourages agencies from acquiring
some location data for fear of being forced to disclose them.
On the other hand, FOIA mandates disclosure only of agency
records and thus offers no access to information outside of govern-
ment.  And, disclosure under FOIA can be burdensome and pro-
tracted.  Although the statute mandates prompt time frames for an
agency response to an inquiry, these deadlines are frequently not
met.28
The Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) by establishing
disclosure conditions for federal research grants under the Shelby
Amendment, augments somewhat the administrative requirements for
information access.  Still, the OMB conditions rely on some form of
publication, even if only a reference by an agency making a decision,
to trigger disclosure.  Therefore, the OMB rules seldom help dissemi-
nate preliminary data.  Even aside from the special OMB require-
ments, general principles of administrative law sometimes compel the
disclosure of private research data when they are central to an agency
rulemaking.  However, in order to employ administrative law to com-
pel agencies to acquire and disclose endangered species data, one
28. Though FOIA requires agencies to respond to record requests in twenty days, 5 U.S.C.
§ 522(a)(6)(A)  (1989), agencies are notoriously dilatory in their compliance.  In a typical exam-
ple, the Department of the Interior did not respond with a partial disclosure of data on grizzly
bears requested on January 5, 1999 for more than five months, until May 14, 1999.  Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Pease v. Babbitt, No. 1:99-CV-113, at 6 (July 29,
1999).
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needs both a final agency action and a meaningful standard of review
to overcome deference to agency managerial decisions.
Just as the special characteristics of environmental restoration
create special problems for access and control of information, the spe-
cial duties of the ESA create distinct legal footholds for improving
information sharing.  Species recovery is an affirmative requirement
for all agencies, and the Services have specific obligations to advance
species conservation.29  Therefore, the Services and agencies manag-
ing habitat need monitoring of the status of endangered species.  Be-
cause much endangered species research involves some risk of harm,
injury, or harassment of individual endangered animals, scientists
need permits from the Services to conduct their work.  This section
concludes with our recommendations for conditioning these permits
on periodic reporting to ensure access to information while allowing
researchers to retain some control.  The Services should use the re-
porting condition also in negotiating a range of cooperative agree-
ments that deal with meeting the obligations of the ESA.
A. The Freedom of Information Act
Data and other information contained in federal agency records
are subject to the disclosure provisions of FOIA.30  Upon receipt of a
request for information, an agency must disclose any records (which
include electronic data, maps, photos, and recordings) that are respon-
sive.  FOIA does not require that an agency conduct investigations to
answer a public query, or even that an agency retain information.  The
agency must disclose only whatever records it might currently have
that contain relevant information.  In deciding whether a document is
an agency record for the purposes of mandatory FOIA disclosure,
courts consider whether the document is: 1) in the agency’s control, 2)
generated within the agency, 3) placed into the agency’s files, or 4)
used by the agency for any purpose.31
FOIA requires an agency to comply with requests only if they
reasonably describe records.  A request that is overly broad or vague
may be unreasonable.  This does not mean that a requester must iden-
tify a particular record.  A requester who clearly and specifically de-
scribes his or her needs is entitled to records that fulfill those needs.
A rule of thumb is that the request must be specific enough to permit
a professional employee who is familiar with the subject matter to lo-
cate the record in a reasonable period of time.
29. The ESA defines conservation to mean recovery of endangered species to the point
where they no longer need the special protections of the ESA.  16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
31. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 157 (1980). See
generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 17.3.1 (1993).
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FOIA carves out nine exceptions to the general rule of
mandatory disclosure.  One exception, that federal natural resources
agencies had used until recently to withhold information concerning
endangered species, is for internal agency matters the disclosure of
which would risk circumvention of a legal requirement.32  The typical
materials protected from disclosure under this exception are law en-
forcement manuals, guidelines and studies (particularly ones that re-
late to an agency’s security vulnerability).  By extension, the Forest
Service argued that Mexican spotted owl and goshawk nest site infor-
mation disclosure would make protection of the sites more burden-
some.  Presumably, public disclosure of the nest locations would direct
people wishing to harass the birds to the most sensitive places.  How-
ever, in 1997, two federal courts of appeals rejected this position of
the Forest Service that nest site information should be exempt under
the internal agency matters exception.33  Under FOIA, maps pinpoint-
ing nest and bird locations are subject to the general disclosure rule.
Though, under a different exception, agencies may redact analy-
ses and interpretations in reports to protect the government’s deliber-
ative process, this exception does not protect purely factual
information related to the policy process.34  This exception may pro-
tect scientific reports that interpret technical data insofar as the opin-
ion of an expert reflects a deliberative phase of policy making.  It may
even protect parts of pre-decisional documents that select certain facts
out of a larger body of data.  Raw data, however, generally remain
subject to the mandatory disclosure policy of FOIA.
Another noteworthy exception from mandatory disclosure under
FOIA is for matters specifically exempt from disclosure by a statute
that either provides no discretion to disclose or that establishes partic-
ular criteria for withholding.35  For instance, the Archaeological Re-
sources Protection Act of 1979 (“ARPA”)36 prohibits release of
information concerning the nature and location of protected archeo-
logical resources unless the relevant agency official determines that
disclosure would further the purposes of ARPA and create no risk of
harm to the resources.
Strangely, though many of the same concerns about illegal re-
moval of or harm to protected resources apply to endangered species
conservation,37 there is no analogous provision in the ESA triggering
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
33. Maricopa Audubon Soc’y  v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1997); Audubon
Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 104 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 1997).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
35. Id. at § 552(b)(3).
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470ll (1994).
37. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. FOR A STUDY ON PROMOTING ACCESS TO
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DATA FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, A QUEST FOR BALANCE: PRI-
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an exception from mandatory disclosure under FOIA for sensitive in-
formation, such as nesting or denning sites.38  In a partial effort to
respond to this lacuna in endangered species law, Congress, in 1998
legislation primarily dealing with national park concession policy but
also addressing research needs, enacted a provision allowing the Na-
tional Park Service to withhold information concerning the “nature
and specific location of a National Park System resource which is en-
dangered, threatened, rare, or commercially valuable .  . . .”39  The
statute provides criteria for releasing this information that is similar to
ARPA standards:
(1) disclosure of the information would further the purposes of the
unit of the National Park System in which the resource . . . is located
and would not create an unreasonable risk of harm . . . ; and
(2) disclosure is consistent with other applicable laws protecting the
resource . . . .40
While the need for statutory protection of precise location infor-
mation that would jeopardize endangered species is clear after the
1997 Audubon cases,41 this new Park Service legislation goes too far.
With no guidance on how to interpret its terms, the legislation ex-
cludes from disclosure not only precise location data but also informa-
tion concerning the “nature” of an endangered species.  This broad
authority, unfortunately, is an invitation for agencies to withhold
whatever national park endangered species information might cause
embarrassment or contradict desired outcomes.  Moreover, if read
broadly, the statute might allow the Park Service to withhold informa-
tion whenever it finds that disclosure would fail to “further the pur-
poses of the unit.”42  Such insulation from outside criticism would
weaken adaptive management for environmental restoration.  While
disclosing certain information may increase the risk of harm to some
endangered species, this must be balanced against the serious risk to
VATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DATABASES 12 (1999)
(statement of Barbara Ryan, Assoc. Director for Operations, U.S. Geological Survey: “publica-
tion of endangered species data sometimes results in further harm to the species at the hands of
those who wish to possess rare commodities”).
38. Like the 1979 ARPA, the 1973 ESA post-dates the 1966 FOIA, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80
Stat. 250.
39. National Park Omnibus Management Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-391, § 207, 112 Stat.
3501 (1998) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 5837 (1999)).  The legislative history of the statute is domi-
nated by discussion of concession management.  There is nothing enlightening in the legislative
history to aid in the interpretation of the provision dealing with information disclosure. See, e.g.,
H. REP. NO. 105-767 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-202 (1998).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 5837.
41. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
42. Such an extreme interpretation, however, would push the boundaries of what consti-
tutes “particular criteria” for withholding information. See Am. Jewish Cong. v. Kreps, 574 F.2d
624, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (requiring a precise formula whereby an agency may determine
whether disclosure would pose the hazard that Congress foresaw).
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recovery of excluding timely, external review of natural resource man-
agement decisions.43
The Interior Department has relied on a broad interpretation of
this Park Service provision to withhold data about grizzly bear behav-
ior from at least one academic scientist interested in evaluating the
effects of current federal land management practices.44  Professor
Craig Pease sought historical location data on grizzly bears to deter-
mine how the bruins become habituated to humans, which is a behav-
ior that ultimately leads to a doubling of the mortality rate for the
bears.45  Grizzly bear recovery is one of the most politically charged
endangered species issues.46  Professor Pease’s collaborator, David
Mattson, had his office files removed, computer documents deleted,
his mail screened, and his travel budget slashed by his superiors while
serving as a field ecologist for the Yellowstone Interagency Grizzly
Bear Study Team because of his criticism of the federal government’s
approach to bear recovery.47  Although the Interior Department may
have exercised reasonable caution in withholding current location
data for existing bears, its categorical denial of historic information on
all bears, whether alive or dead, illustrates the temptation toward se-
crecy that discretionary control of data engenders.  Knowing the his-
toric roaming patterns of grizzly bears through their enormous range
would not enable poachers to pinpoint their locations in the manner
that release of current owl nest sites would.  Probably the Interior De-
partment interpreted its new authority broadly to avoid the risk of
criticism of its intention to remove the grizzly bear from the list of
protected species under the ESA.48  The Department justifies broad,
exclusive control over the location data, in part, by asserting the clas-
sic science counterweight to disclosure: that government scientists
should have the first opportunity to analyze the data before releasing
it to others.49
So, with some narrow exceptions (e.g., for certain Park System
resources), when a federal agency itself, such as FWS, conducts re-
43. Tim W. Clark et al., supra note 5, at 425.
44. Pease v. Babbitt, Civ. No. 1:99-CV-113 (Sept. 20, 1999).
45. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Pease v. Babbitt, No. 1:99-CV-
113, at 3 (July 29, 1999).
46. See, e.g., Todd Wilkinson, Grizzly War, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 9, 1998; Emily
Miller, Trouble for Grizzly Bear Recovery Plan, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 14, 1997.
47. Wilkinson, supra note 46.  The suppression of Mattson and his data is also noted in
FREDERICK WAGNER, WILDLIFE POLICIES IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 103 (1995); Oversight Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on National Parks and Public Lands of the House Comm. on Re-
sources, 105th Cong. 34 (1997)  (testimony of Dean Wagner).
48. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 64 Fed. Reg. 64482, 64521-22 (1999) (including de-list-
ing of grizzly bear as an expected long-term regulatory action).
49. Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, Pease v. Babbitt, No. 1:99-CV-113, at 12 (Aug. 12, 1999).  This justification, however,
has no basis in FOIA.
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search, the public generally has access to the information generated
through FOIA. When a federal agency acquires (e.g., through a condi-
tion in a research permit) endangered species data gathered by others,
then the public usually has access to the records under FOIA.  How-
ever, scientists working for universities and other non-profit institu-
tions, who conduct most conservation biology studies, frequently do
not operate under permits with species reporting requirements.  What
obligation do these scientists outside of the agencies have to disclose
information?  Some legal obligation may arise from strings attached to
federal research awards.
B. The OMB Disclosure Requirements Under the
Shelby Amendment
The principle that “what the federal government funds, the public
is entitled to see” may be fair, but the actual law is considerably less
expansive and more complicated.  In 1998, Congress sought to ensure
that “all data produced” from federal awards of grants be available to
the public through the procedures established under FOIA.50  Buried
on page 496 of a 920-page omnibus appropriations bill, the provision,
commonly called the “Shelby Amendment,” delegates implementa-
tion to the OMB through the administrative requirements for federal
grants and agreements with non-profit organizations (including
universities).
In 1999, the OMB published the new disclosure requirements.51
In promulgating its interpretation of the legislation, the OMB pur-
ported to balance three goals: 1) the advancement of the public inter-
est in widely available information, 2) the maintenance of the
traditional scientific process to ensure that research may continue to
progress, and 3) the establishment of practical implementation proce-
dures for public access.  The most significant concern of the scientific
community with the new disclosure condition of federal funding was
that researchers would be forced to work in a “fishbowl” that would
unveil data and research methods prematurely.  The OMB responded
to this concern by stressing that the disclosure requirements would
protect the confidentiality of data while research is ongoing.52
The OMB requirements clarify that the federal government has
the right to obtain and use data produced under an award.  Such data
would then be subject to FOIA.  However, if the federal government
50. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub.
L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-495 (1998).
51. OMB Circular A-110, Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agree-
ments with Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations, 64
Fed. Reg. 54926 (1999).
52. Id. at 54927.
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itself fails to act to obtain the data, the OMB interprets the 1998 legis-
lation to obligate awardees to respond to a FOIA request for “re-
search data relating to published research findings produced under an
award that were used by the Federal Government in developing an
agency action that has the force and effect of law . . . .”53  The OMB
materials define research data as “recorded factual material com-
monly accepted in the scientific community as necessary to validate
research findings,” and specifically exclude “preliminary analyses,
drafts of scientific papers, plans for future research, peer-reviews, or
communications with colleagues.”54  The OMB requirements bind all
federally funded research, even if the federal support is a small pro-
portion of the total research budget.  As “faith-based” social programs
are now discovering, federal strings come attached to the very first
(even if the only) dollar of government money.
The key action triggering disclosure under the OMB require-
ments is publication.  Unless the data requested by a member of the
public (including a fellow scientist) are published, researchers have no
obligation to disclose.  Absent publication, data are unavailable un-
less: 1) a federal agency obtains them, 2) some other obligation (e.g.,
in a permit or cooperative agreement) requires disclosure, or 3) the
researcher volunteers them.  For the purposes of the OMB require-
ments, data are considered published not only when they appear in a
peer-reviewed scientific or technical journal.  Data are also considered
published when a “[f]ederal agency publicly and officially cites the re-
search findings in support of an agency action that has the force and
effect of law.”55
The question of what constitutes “an action that has the force and
effect of law”56 is one that will likely generate some conflict in the
coming years.  The OMB interpretive material states that a rule (such
as an ESA listing or delisting decision) or an administrative order
(such as the issuance of a permit) falls within the meaning of the key
phrase.  In contrast, agency guidance documents fall outside of the
agency actions that trigger publication under the OMB require-
ments.57  On which side of the divide does an endangered species re-
covery plan fall?
The recovery plan, an ESA requirement for all protected spe-
cies,58 contains three elements.  First, each plan contains a description
53. Id. at 54930.
54. Id.  This exclusion parallels FOIA disclosure exception for deliberative material. See
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 54929.
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1999).  A single recovery plan may cover several species linked by
common habitat or threat. As of February 20, 2001, 975 species had approved recovery plans.
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of “site-specific management actions” necessary for recovery.59  These
actions are divided into three priority levels: urgent tasks necessary to
prevent extinction, tasks that forestall significant further decline, and
long-term tasks required for full recovery.  Second, the plan must pro-
vide “objective, measurable criteria” for determining when the species
has recovered.60  Third, the plan includes estimates of the time and
money required to meet recovery and intermediate goals that lead to-
ward recovery.61  Good monitoring information is necessary to imple-
ment all three of these elements, but especially the second.
The Services do not regard the plans as binding, and courts gener-
ally have refused to compel implementation of plans.62  In this narrow
sense, then, the recovery plan does not have the force and effect of
law because it is mere guidance.63  From this perspective, the recovery
plan does not trigger “publication” for information disclosure under
the OMB requirements.  However, courts will require the Services to
prepare adequate plans.  For instance, courts have remanded recovery
plans to the FWS for failure to provide objective, measurable criteria
for recovery that addressed the factors on which the listings were
based.64  In this respect, courts treat the recovery plan like the envi-
ronmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act:65 courts will compel agencies to prepare the document, and to
rewrite the document if its content does not meet the statutory crite-
ria; however, courts will not compel agencies to implement the provi-
sions discussed in the document.  So, if “an action that has the force
and effect of law” corresponds to “agency actions” under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (“APA”) that are subject to judicial review,66
then studies cited in recovery plans do trigger the OMB requirements
for disclosure.  As illustrated below, the APA itself will compel agen-
cies to include information supporting “agency actions” in the public
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES SYSTEM BOX SCORE,
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess/html/boxscore.html (last visited July 10, 2001).
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(i).
60. Id. at § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii).
61. Id. at § 1533(f)(1)(B)(iii).
62. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987).
Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 26, 58-59 (1996). But see Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-
069, 36 Envt’l Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1533, 1541, 1993 WL 151353, at *8 (W.D. Tex.  Feb. 1, 1993),
appeal dismissed, Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 995 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1993)  (requiring the FWS to
develop and implement a recovery plan).
63. Fund for Animals v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 547 (11th Cir. 1996) (recovery plan is “for gui-
dance purposes only”); Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 792 F. Supp. 834, 835 (D.D.C. 1992)
(recovery plan is not an “action document”). See Federico Cheever, Recovery Planning, the
Courts, and the Endangered Species Act, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 106, 109 (2001).
64. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F. Supp. 2d 121, 133-34 (D.D.C. 2001)
(remand of Sonoran pronghorn plan); Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 110-14
(D.D.C. 1995), opinion amended by 967 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997) (remand of grizzly bear recov-
ery plan). See Cheever, supra note 63, at 109-10.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4345 (1989).
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 702 (1989).
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administrative record.67  The better interpretation of the OMB rule
would compel disclosure for at least those agency decisions, such as
adoption of a recovery plan, subject to the judicial review require-
ments of a contemporaneous agency record containing the supportive
information.
C. Disclosure Under the ESA
The ESA is the legal cornerstone for environmental recovery.  As
Aldo Leopold famously observed, “to keep every cog and wheel is the
first precaution of intelligent tinkering.”68  Species are essential ele-
ments of our diverse ecosystems.  Because the ESA imposes relatively
stringent duties on scientists and agencies, it provides specific author-
ity to put into practice the general principles of information disclo-
sure.  In particular, the federal government’s duty to recover species,
and the scientists’ obligation to secure permits to engage in research
that impacts endangered species, require improved access to data.
1. Listing
At least with respect to agency rulemaking, the OMB require-
ments are not an abrupt departure from existing administrative law.
For instance, in a celebrated 1994 decision, a federal court found the
FWS listing of the coastal California gnatcatcher to violate the ESA
and APA69 because the public administrative record did not contain
the underlying raw data supporting a disputed scientific paper.70  In
the gnatcatcher controversy, the listing of the subspecies hinged on
whether its geographic range extended southward to thirty degrees,
north, latitude, in which case it qualified for protection under the
ESA, or whether its geographic range extended southward to twenty-
five degrees, north, latitude, in which case its range included popula-
tions sufficient to preclude listing.  In 1988, Dr. Jonathan Atwood of
the Manomet Bird Observatory prepared a report in which he inter-
preted his field data describing variations in California gnatcatcher
morphology to establish the more southerly boundary to the subspe-
cies’ range.  After peer review of the paper, Dr. Atwood revised his
conclusions in 1990 to establish the southern boundary at thirty de-
grees.  Based partly on Atwood’s revised paper, in 1993 the FWS
67. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971); see infra
notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
68. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC WITH OTHER ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION
FROM ROUND RIVER 177 (Oxford Univ. Press 1966) (1949) (The Round River).
69. Relevant provisions include 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 701, 702, and 706.
70. Endangered Species Comm. of the Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Southern Cal. v. Babbitt, 852
F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1994).
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listed the coastal Californian gnatcatcher to receive protection under
the ESA as a subspecies.71
During the comment period for the proposed listing, the future
plaintiffs in the litigation, including the local builders’ trade associa-
tion, made requests for the raw data to both the FWS and to Atwood
himself.  In the listing, the FWS had reviewed only the scientist’s re-
ports, not the raw data.  Since the federal agency had not reviewed the
raw data in making its determination, they were not agency records.
Therefore, the FWS did not disclose them.  Atwood himself refused to
disclose the information to the future plaintiffs because he believed
that they were on “some sort of statistical ‘witch hunt’.”72
The court found the listing to be illegal because the trade associa-
tion had not been able to review and comment on the raw field data,
which played an important role in determining the range of the sub-
species.  The court cited the general principle of administrative law
that when an agency relies on data to craft a rule, it generally must
provide those data for public review.73  In this case, the federal gov-
ernment argued that it did not rely on the raw data, as such, but in-
stead relied on scientific reports based on the data.  The court viewed
this claim skeptically.
In addition, the ESA requires that listing decisions be based
solely on the “best scientific and commercial data available.”74
Though some courts have allowed agencies to rely on reports inter-
preting data rather than the data themselves, the gnatcatcher court
distinguished the litigation at issue because the Atwood reports were
highly disputed.75  When a controversy surrounds interpretation of
data in a report, the court concluded, the law requires that the data be
disclosed for public review.  In making this finding, the court distin-
guished the legal process from scientific peer review, which (according
to an American Ornithological Union statement in the record) does
not usually require an ornithologist to provide the underlying raw
data to support a scientific paper.
The outcome of the gnatcatcher case is consistent with the cur-
rent requirements of the OMB.  However, it is important to note that
there was no question that the data involved in the controversy were
final, not preliminary.  Atwood had published his papers, and they
had undergone traditional peer review.  The much more difficult case
faced today by people interested in monitoring species conservation
71. Under the ESA, “species” protected may be biological species, subspecies, or any dis-
tinct population segment of vertebrates that interbreeds when mature.  16 U.S.C. § 1532(16).
72. 852 F. Supp. at 34.
73. Id. at 36.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
75. 852 F. Supp. at 37.
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efforts is access to data that researchers claim is preliminary.  The only
ESA circumstance where a court has compelled release of preliminary
information involved the FWS listing of the Bruneau Hot Springs
snail as an endangered species.76  The court found that a “provisional”
U.S. Geological Survey report did not merely supplement or confirm
existing data.77  Instead it “provided the only scientific information on
the cause of the decline in spring flows,” which destroyed the snail
habitat.78  Therefore, the Service should have given the public an op-
portunity to review and comment on the report.
However, in the absence of some final agency action reviewable
under the terms of the APA,79 we currently lack a mechanism for
compelling access to unpublished species information.  Federal agen-
cies argue that disclosure of grizzly bear data would be premature un-
til the data are published at some indeterminate time in the future,
likely when a delisting rule is published and critics face a brief period
in which to comment.80  At that point, useful outside scientific scrutiny
will be difficult, given the unpredictable and brief time frame.
It is also important to note that the FWS used the Atwood con-
clusion to support a notice and comment rulemaking, a relatively in-
volved administrative process.  Even preparation of a recovery plan
requires a supporting administrative record.81  The more difficult case
faced today involves administrative actions that are less formal, such
as management decisions about where, when, and how to close roads
or release birds.  Though the broadly applicable principles of FOIA
and the OMB requirements for federally funded research leave these
issues open to debate, the ESA itself provides additional law promot-
ing disclosure where listed species are involved.
2. Other ESA Duties and the Need for Reporting Requirements
in Permits
The ESA imposes an affirmative, but nonspecific duty on federal
agencies to contribute to the recovery of listed species.  Although
courts consistently hold that the duty to conserve requires some ac-
tion, or some reason why the agency has not acted, they seldom set
76. Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 53 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) (remanding the en-
dangered species listing decision for the Bruneau Hot Springs snail).
77. Id. at 1402.
78. Id. at 1403.
79. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1989) (defining “agency action” as “a rule, order, license, sanction,
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act”); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (providing judicial
review for “agency action”).
80. The administrative procedure for delisting parallels the one for listing.  16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(c)(2).  For a thorough analysis of delisting issues, see Holly Doremus, Delisting Endan-
gered Species: An Aspirational Goal, Not a Realistic Expectation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10434
(2000).  The comment period for proposed delistings may be as brief as forty-five to sixty days.
81. See supra note 64.
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out precisely what it requires or rely on it as the sole basis for over-
turning an agency’s decision.82  In order to explain how they are meet-
ing this duty, the agencies need information on the relationship
between their programs/actions and the effects on the listed species.
This duty, then, creates a federal demand to generate or acquire
records containing conservation biology data.  In this section, we rec-
ommend that agencies modify ESA permits and cooperative agree-
ments to require periodic monitoring or reports.  This will provide the
agencies and the public alike with better information on how well
agencies are meeting their ESA recovery duties.  Most researchers al-
ready operate under permits and agreements, which provide a vehicle
for advancing the public interest in species recovery.
Other, more specific, requirements of the ESA strengthen the
case for better central reporting of endangered species information.
As discussed in section III(B), above, the Services have special re-
sponsibilities to develop recovery plans for listed species.83  Among
other things, the plans include “site-specific management actions”
necessary for recovery and “objective, measurable criteria” for deter-
mining when the species has recovered.84  A separate provision of the
ESA prohibits federal agencies (including the Services) from authoriz-
ing any activity (or issuing a permit) that is likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of a listed species.  It is difficult to fathom how
agencies can fulfill these duties without improved information and
review.
The broadest proscriptions of the ESA apply to everybody and
ban a wide range of activities that injure, harm, harass, wound, trap,
capture or collect individual endangered animals.85  Harm includes
“significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral pat-
terns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”86  Research on and
management of endangered species often involves manipulation of
habitat or close examination that might run afoul of these ESA
prohibitions.
However, the Services issue permits to allow these otherwise pro-
hibited activities for “scientific purposes or to enhance the propaga-
82. ROBERT L. FISCHMAN & MARK S. SQUILLACE, ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING:
NEPA AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 175-76 (3d ed. 2000); J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of
the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal
Agencies’ Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107 (1995). But see Sierra Club v. Glickman,
156 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the U.S. Department of Agriculture violated the
affirmative conservation duty by failing to develop an organized program for utilizing its authori-
ties for the conservation of listed species dependent on the Edwards Aquifer in Texas).
83. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
85. Id. at  §§ 1532(19), 1539(a).
86. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2000).
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tion or survival” of listed species.87  This science and enhancement
permit is a close cousin of the better-known incidental take permit,
described in Professor Sax’s article.88  However, the science and en-
hancement permit does not require a habitat conservation plan, the
most controversial and burdensome element of an incidental take per-
mit.  Other than specifying that the permitted activities should be “for
scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the
affected species,”89 the statute contains no special requirements for
the content of the permit.  Most research involving listed species re-
quires this science/enhancement permit.  The ESA grants broad au-
thority to the Services to condition a research permit on terms to
promote recovery of the species.90  As with all permitting decisions,
the issuance of a science/enhancement permit requires the Service to
comply with the ESA requirement to ensure that any action author-
ized does not jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered
species or adversely modify critical habitat.91
In order to prevent jeopardy and contribute to recovery, the Ser-
vices need information on the status of listed species, the efforts un-
derway to recover them, the likely impact of proposed activities on
listed species, and the cumulative impacts of other ongoing or pro-
posed activities.  In an effort to make the most of existing research,
the Services ought to condition research permits on periodic reporting
of collected data.  Reports should include observations of conditions
that may warrant further investigation by the agency (e.g., possible
illegal activities, or problems outside the expertise of the researcher
that might require other expert opinion or research); assessments of
monitoring, research, or management techniques employed; and re-
sults relevant to conservation of the species.
Permits to discharge or emit otherwise prohibited pollutants com-
monly contain reporting conditions to allow the regulating agencies
and the public to monitor the environment.92  For research permits
under the ESA, the fit between specified data reporting and the per-
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A).
88. Sax, supra note 2, at 5.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A).
90. Id. at § 1539(a)(2)(B).  The science permit program receives little outside scrutiny and
there is a wide variation from region to region in how the Services implement it.  For instance, in
FWS Region 2 (the Southwest Region), researchers fill out Form 3-200, Federal Fish and Wild-
life License/Permit Application, to obtain their own individual permit.  The FWS cannot grant
the permit until it publishes notice of the application to provide opportunity for public comment
under 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B).  In FWS Region 6 (the Mountain-Prairie Region), the regional
director holds a scientific permit and researchers request status as subpermitees without the
need to apply for individual permits.
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
92. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) (1987) (NPDES permit conditions on data and informa-
tion collection and reporting); 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(h) (2000) (duty of permitee to provide infor-
mation); id. at § 122.41(l) (reporting requirements, including periodic discharge monitoring
reports in permits).
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mit purpose is much tighter because the very purpose of the permit
often is to collect information.  Though the research may harm a spe-
cies in the short-run, we allow it to continue because we believe it will
benefit recovery in the long term.  Access to research information can
secure that long-term benefit.
It is long past time for the Services to promote more assertively
the public conservation interest through permit conditions on scien-
tific and enhancement permits.  The reporting requirements we rec-
ommend here would also improve incidental take permits, which need
better documentation of monitoring and of implementation of takes
and mitigation.93  The details of the timing and content requirements
may be tailored by the Services to particular circumstances, but re-
ports should allow responsible review of activities at least annually.
The Services themselves should meet this reporting requirement
where they directly engage in monitoring, management, enhancement
and scientific activities.  Moreover, the Services should incorporate re-
porting conditions into cooperative agreements with states, universi-
ties, and nonprofit organizations.  These agreements are important
existing tools with which the Services coordinate species management,
habitat enhancement, and research.  Safe harbor agreements94 and
conservation agreements,95 two relatively recent innovations in the
ESA program, likewise must include regular information disclosure.
Permits and agreements should also require quick notification of un-
anticipated adverse impacts to endangered species, as is already the
case with incidental take statements attached to biological opinions
issued by the Services as a result of formal consultation.96  These re-
93. PETER KAREIVA ET AL., USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 3-4 (1999),
available at http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/projects/hcp (summarized in Frances James, Lessons
Learned from a Study of Habitat Conservation Planning, 49 BIOSCIENCE 871 (1999)).  While the
FWS disagreed with the report’s conclusions about the lack of biological information, it has
recently amended its HCP handbook to provide for measurable biological objectives, incorpo-
rate adaptive management, and develop better monitoring. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S.
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE’S RESPONSE TO AIBS/NCEAS’S STUDY USING SCIENCE IN
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS, available at http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/response.htm  (last
visited Sept. 21, 2000); Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg 35242 (June 1, 2000)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. parts 13 and 17).
94. Safe harbor agreements allow a landowner to enhance habitat in exchange for a shield
from liability for its subsequent destruction. See Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Con-
servation Agreements with Assurances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32706 (June 17, 1999). See also J.B. Ruhl,
Who Needs Congress?  An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367 (1998).
95. Conservation agreements may defer listing of species in exchange for conservation ac-
tions. See id.; Robert L. Fischman, Endangered Species Conservation: What Should We Expect of
Federal Agencies?, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1992); Announcement of Final Policy for Candidate
Conservation Agreements with Assurances,  64 Fed. Reg. 32726 (June 17, 1999).
96. Formal consultation is the process by which agencies, including the Services themselves,
meet their duty to ensure that actions authorized, funded and carried out by them do not jeop-
ardize the continued existence of endangered species or adversely modify critical habitat.  16
U.S.C. § 1536 (1999).
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porting requirements would provide the Services with information
they are already bound to collect.
Scientists currently benefit from internet web sites that post
ongoing information about field or captive programs in support of en-
dangered species recovery.97  Furthermore, written reports are often
already required by state agencies that issue permits,98 by the National
Park Service and other federal agencies for research on their lands,99
and by funding sources as well.  Annual reports do not impede the
simultaneous preparation of manuscripts for publication; indeed, they
might encourage it.  Annual reports would not need to contain the
kinds of advanced analysis and synthesis associated with full-blown,
peer-reviewed publications.  Researchers can provide appropriate ca-
veats to deflect overly enthusiastic interpretation of results and to ed-
ucate readers regarding the uncertainties.  A display of reports on a
web site would provide a central location to facilitate work by re-
searchers, resource managers, educators, students, and the general
public. Though mechanisms to protect precise location data for spe-
cies vulnerable to persecution would need to be a part of any system
of access, these need not greatly reduce the available information.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our current, haphazard approach to endangered species research
provides too little information.  Peer-reviewed publication is a tradi-
tional and essential method of dispersing information; and, in the con-
tentious and passionate atmosphere that surrounds endangered
species, peer review can be an important tool for careful evaluation of
methods and results.  But, peer review also demands hopeful patience
without providing any guarantee that desired data will appear.
Moreover, exactly those programs that may be most in need of
review–resource management without explicit research compo-
nents–have the least exposure to it.
97. In the case of the Meretsky et al., research, discussed supra note 26 and accompanying
text, web sites supported by the Peregrine Fund and Ventana Wilderness Society were excellent
sources of information on dates and suspected or confirmed causes of mortality; and numbers,
ages and sexes of released birds. See, e.g., VENTANA WILDERNESS SOC’Y, CONDOR REIN-
TRODUCTION: NOTES FROM THE FIELD, http://www.ventanaws.org/fldnotes.htm; PEREGRINE
FUND: NOTES FROM THE FIELD, http://www.peregrinefund.org/notes_condor.html#notes from
the field.  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service maintains a web page on which it posts recovery
plans. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THE ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM, http://endan-
gered.fws.gov/recovery/recplans/index.htm.  The volume and usefulness of web-based informa-
tion vary widely from agency to agency, but access is generally increasing.
98. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R12-4-418(G) (2001) (requiring a written report at the
end of the term of each “scientific collecting permit”); UTAH ADMIN. CODE R657-3-16 (2001)
(requiring a report for “collection, importation, transportation, and possession of zoological ani-
mals” permits).  One of the coauthors has engaged in scientific research under permits requiring
reports in the following states: Arizona, Indiana, Utah.
99. See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., RESEARCH PERMIT AND REPORTING SYSTEM,  http://sci-
ence.nature.nps.gov/servlet/Prmt_PubIndex.
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Annual reports are not reviews, but they can provide informal
opportunities for outside comment, which is far more useful as a
course correction for adaptive management than a post mortem.100  If
annual reports can provide a less threatening forum for comment, the
result may be improved evaluations during formal review.  This will
eventually reduce resistence to the whole process.  Impartial, periodic
review of management efforts is imperative for successful recovery.101
Proprietary reluctance to share widely endangered species infor-
mation is in neither our own best interests nor in the species’ best
interests.  Annual reporting requirements in exchange for permission
to study the public’s biological treasures is a fair balance between ac-
cess and control.  Such a requirement would provide a venue for re-
porting minor insights and advances that might otherwise go
unpublished.  Centrally and promptly available internet web reports
can benefit listed species, individual researchers, and the conservation
effort; and, they would be much harder to ignore than reports whose
existence is less well known.
Because the Services will bear the brunt of collecting and posting
the reports, they will need additional budget monies and personnel to
prepare their own reports and assemble the rest. However, unlike re-
cent budget battles over funding the ESA listing program, increased
efficiency, sounder science, and public information have widespread
support irrespective of party or environmental affiliation.102  In-
creased demand for ready access to public information grows every
day, and technology facilitates compliance with information responsi-
bilities to endangered species far more easily now than ever before.103
The inability of agencies to withhold precise data for current nest-
ing, denning, and other relatively static locations outside of the na-
tional parks cannot be so easily remedied with an administrative
initiative.  Congress must provide a narrowly drawn exception to the
general disclosure rule of FOIA for this information where it pin-
points endangered species under circumstances where access would
100. See, e.g., D.G. Kleiman et al., Improving the Evaluation of Conservation Programs, 14
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 356 (2000).
101. Clark et al., supra note 5, at 425.
102. For instance, the portion of the National Park Omnibus Management Act of 1998, supra
note 41, designed “to encourage the publication and dissemination of information derived from
studies in the National Park System,” 16 U.S.C. § 5931(5) (1999), and to “assure the full and
proper utilization of results of scientific study for park management decisions,” 16 U.S.C. § 5936,
received strong support from both Senator Craig Thomas (a Wyoming Republican generally
hostile to environmental protection measures) and Charles Clusen, Senior Policy Analyst for the
Natural Resources Defense Council. Hearings on S. 1693 Before the Subcomm. on National
Parks, Historic Preservation and Recreation of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, 105th Cong. (1998).
103. In the pollution control field, annual reporting of toxic releases has spurred important
preventive measures to improve environmental quality. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Informa-
tion as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Par-
adigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001).
\\Server03\productn\W\WBN\41-1\WBN107.txt unknown Seq: 24 29-NOV-01 13:32
2001] Endangered Species Information 113
risk jeopardy to the species.  The lesson of the 1998 Park Service legis-
lation is that where Congress provides agencies with broader discre-
tion to withhold information, they will insulate less sensitive data from
public scrutiny.  This secrecy may ultimately be more harmful to the
recovery effort than the loss of several animals to poachers.
None of us likes annual physical exams, but we admit the useful-
ness of the information, and, more grudgingly, the chance to have our
complacency regarding our health shaken a bit.  A required annual
physical for our endangered species, delivered by those who work
with them, or whose work affects them, is in everyone’s best interests.
The “new age of environmental restoration” demands it.
